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The Stark Was Ready! 
By Commander John Jackson, Supply Corps, U. S. Navy 
One of the oft-proved laws of the sea is 
that the difference between a ship sunk 
and saved is the crew's ability to perform 
damage control (DC). 
In describing the damage control effort 
on board the USS Stark (FFG-31) after 
she was hit by two Iraqi Exocet missiles, 
No drill could fully prepare the 
Stark's crew members for 3,500° 
fires, choking smoke, a 16° list, 
dehydration, fatigue, and heavy casu-
alties. But their intense, all-hands 
damage control training saved the 
ship. 
the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of 
the Navy for Safety and Survivability, 
Joseph K . Taussig, Jr., a veteran of the 
Pearl Harbor attack, stated, "In a sur-
prise attack . . . their reaction to sudden 
trauma was outstanding. They responded 
with the same ingenuity, bravery , and 
dedication that American sailors always 
seem to." 
And while it may be hard for the fami-
lies of those sailors who died or were in-
jured in the attack to accept, a number of 
observers have suggested that it was for-
tunate that the Stark was the target, since 
she was arguably better prepared to con-
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trol the damage than many other fleet 
units. 
Realistic Training for All Hands: It is 
vitally important that everyone on board 
ship be fully prepared to react in an emer-
gency situation quickly, correctly, and 
effectively. This requires dedication to 
damage control, and a realistic and aggres-
sive training program-one that goes far 
beyond simply checking off the DC 
portions of the personnel qualification 
standards system or conducting the occa-
sional drill for the duty section fire party . 
While the U.S. Navy has long been rec-
ognized for the overall excellence of its 
damage control programs, we all have 
seen instances where other shipboard 
functions have encroached on the time 
and resources that should have been spent 
on DC. 
Ninety percent of the work necessary 
to save a damaged ship must be accom-
plished before the damage occurs. Once 
the compartment fills with smoke and the 
fires begin to rage out of control, it is too 
late to get serious about damage control. 
The crew of the Stark did take DC seri-
ously from the day the ship was commis-
sioned; that is why she is afloat today. 
Strong leadership directing a strong DC 
program was the foundation of the 
Stark's DC posture. 
Years of experience show that simply 
proclaiming a policy ("DC is impor-
tant!") will not change anyone's behav-
ior. The words must be backed by action. 
In the Stark, no one was promoted unless 
he demonstrated a high level of compe-
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tence in damage control. To be recom-
mended for E-4 , for example, a seaman 
had to be fully qualified as a fire team 
member. To move up to E-5, the petty 
officer had to be qualified in all stations 
up to and including investigator. To be 
eligible for first class, crew members 
were required to qualify as on-scene lead-
ers. And anyone seeking a recommenda -
tion for chief petty officer had to be a 
fully qualified locker leader. In the ward-
room, all ensigns had to qualify as on-
scene leaders within six months of report-
ing on board , and had to become a repair 
locker leader before pinning on lieutenant 
(junior grade) bars. 
These rules applied regardless of rating 
or designator. They pulled the ship to-
gether for a common goal: keeping the 
Stark ready to fight and survive. One 
measure of the Stark's readiness was that 
even after taking severe casualties, she 
still carried 35 crew members who were 
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fu II y qualified on-scene leaders. 
Another way the Stark's crew prepared 
to deal with a major disaster was by con-
ducting realistic first aid training for all 
hands . This included the use of graphi-
c ally accurate artificial wounds to simu-
l~tte the carnage of a real accident. To 
a void relying - repeatedly on the same 
'-Veil-trained individuals, the more experi-
c need crew member s frequently were se-
1 ccted to pose as casualties during the 
drills to force less seasoned personnel to 
assume greater responsibilities. Each drill 
'-Vas scripted, prehriefed, and conducted 
as if it were in preparation for a major 
inspection . Written scenarios were devel-
oped for each drill , with the emphasis on 
realism and dealing with the unexpected . 
By varying the simulated damage, substi-
tuting new members into fire-fighting 
teams , and forcing innovation and crea-
tivity into each scenario, the crew's ac-
tions began to be second nature . 
Most home ports provide many assets 
to help hone the crew's damage control 
skills . On board the Stark, crew members 
made every effort to use such help when-
ever possible. Quotas for fire-fighting 
school were never missed, and the ser-
vices of the portable DC trainer at the Lit-
tle Creek Fleet training unit were used as 
late as one week before beginning the 
deployment that was cut short by the 
Exocet missiles. The entire crew went 
through the trainer, from the command-
ing officer on down . The sight of the 
skipper, dripping wet from fighting simu-
lated fire and flooding, did a great deal to 
underline the importance he placed on 
DC. 
In looking back after the accident, it 
becomes obvious that even though the 
crew trained and drilled with demanding 
scenarios, these scenarios were never big 
enough or challenging enough to simulate 
the degree of damage faced after the mis-
sile attacks. Even the "mass conflagra-
tion" drill on which the crew exercised 
during refresher training (Reffra) off 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba , failed to simu-
late the horrifying situation faced on 
board ship the day of the attack . One les-
son learned: when planning major drills, 
throw in every contingency and complex-
We Gave 110% and Saved the Stark 
By Lieutenant Art Conklin, U. S. Navy 
EDITOR'S NOTE: Lieutenant Art Conklin, the Stark's 
damage control assistant (DCA), was cited by the Secre-
tar y of the Navy for "providing heroic and inspirational 
leadership by example throughout all forward fire-fight-
ing efforts ... a,1d for courageous and prompt actions 
which saved lives and were instrume111al in saving the 
ship ." Here he tells of the events on the day of the 
Stark's attack, 17 May 1987. 
We had been operating in the Gulf for two months, 
and although commercial tankers were being attacked 
with some regularity, there were few diversions in our 
boring, day-to-day routine . 
At approximately 2112, I heard the horrible sound of 
grinding metal, and my first thought was that we had 
collided with another ship. I immediately opened my 
stateroom door and headed for Damage Control (DC) 
Central. Within a fraction of a second I knew we were 
in trouble. I smelled missile exhaust and heard over the 
IMC, "Inbound missile , port side ... all hands brace 
for shock!" Then general quarters (GQ) sounded and I 
saw the crew move faster than they ever had before . The 
first missile had slammed into the ship under the port 
bridge wing, about eight feet above the waterline. Its 
speed at impact was more than 600 miles per hour. The 
warhead did not explode, but the missile did deposit sev-
eral hundred pounds of burning rocket propellant as it 
passed through passageways, berthing compartments, the 
barbershop, post office, and chief petty officer quarters. 
And although we did not know it at the time, the missile 
still had most of its fuel on board, since it had traveled 
only 22 miles from the launching aircraft to our ship. 
The potent mix of the missile's fuel and oxidizer resulted 
in fires hotter than 3,500° Fahrenheit that instantly ig-
nited all combustibles and melted structural material s. 
This temperature was nearly double the l ,800° normally 
considered the upper limit in shipboard fires. 
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